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RECENT DECISIONS
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CITY HOME RULE LAw--LOCAL
LAW OF CITY OF NEW YORK IMPOSING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
OF REGULATIONS OF PRICE ADMINISTRATOR.-The State of New York
passed a law imposing a fine of not more than twenty-five dollars and
five days in jail for the willful violation of price ceilings fixed by the
Federal Price Administrator. New York City thereafter passed a
law imposing liability for violations of the O.P.A. price ceilings in
which the penalties for such violations were a fine of fifty dollars, ten
days in jail, and other penalties, such as a forfeiture of license, if any,
issued by the city. The local law did not specify that willful viola-
tions alone were punishable. Defendant was convicted and fined fifty
dollars under the city law for willfully selling chickens, within the
City of New York, at a price in excess of the price ceiling. The
defendant contended that the New York City law was unconstitu-
tional. The only question involved on this appeal was the question
of the validity or invalidity of the New York City law.
Held, conviction affirmed. The local law of the City of New York
which imposes penalties for the violation of regulations of the Federal
Price Administrator is within the legislative power of the City as
defined in the State Constitution, the City Home Rule Law, and the
New York City Charter. The fact that it imposes higher penalties
than are imposed by the New York State War Emergency Act does
not make it inconsistent with that statute. People v. Lewis, 295 N. Y.
42, 64 N. E. (2d) 702 (1945).
The first contention of the defendant was that the city had no
power to pass a price control law. However, the New York State
Constitution,1 the New York City Home Rule Law,2 and the New
York City Charter 3 confer upon the New York City Council the
power to provide by local law for the preservation and promotion of
the health, safety, and general welfare of its inhabitants, and a price
control law is a valid exercise of the power to promote the general
welfare.
The defendant's second contention was that the city law was
unconstitutional because it conflicted with a similar state law, in that
the city law imposed greater penalties than the state law. Generally,
when a city law is inconsistent with a state law, the city law is invalid.
But a mere difference in penalty is not such an inconsistency as to
invalidate the city law.4
I N. Y. CoNsT. Art. IX, § 12.2 CITY Hoary RuLE LAW § 11, subd. 2.
3 N. Y. CIr CHARTER § 27.4 Wood v. City of Brooklyn, 14 Barb. 425, 429 (N. Y. 1852); City of
Brooklyn v. Toynbee, 31 Barb. 282, 284 (N. Y. 1857).
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The final contention of the defendant was that the city law im-
posed penalties for non-willful as well as willful violations, whereas
the state law only penalized willful violations, and that therefore the
local law was unconstitutional. But the defendant was convicted of
a willful violation. Thus the question of a non-willful violation is not
involved in this case, and the court will not anticipate a question of
constitutionality unless it is necessary to the proper rendition of judg-
ment in the case.5
E.W.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-NEGLIGENCE-FALURE TO MAIN-
TAIN FIRE DEPARTMENT AND EQUIPMENT.-A fire broke out in
plaintiff's building, which destroyed his property. An action was
brought by him for damages suffered as a result of this fire. Plain-
tiff alleged that the city negligently failed to keep in repair the pres-
sure and flow regulating valve located near plaintiff's property and
that by reason of such negligence an insufficient supply of water was
provided to combat effectively the fire in question. Plaintiff based
his right of action on the city charter which provided that the city
"may construct and operate a system of waterworks ... and it shall
maintain fire, police, school, and poor departments." Held, for de-
fendant. The complaint failed to state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action. Steitz v. City of Beacon, 295 N. Y. 51, 64 N. E. (2d)
704 (1945).
The majority opinion in this case reasoned that although the
defendant's sovereign immunity was waived by Section 8 of the Court
of Claims Act, its liability, like that of an individual or a corporation,
was predicated on the circumstances alleged in the complant. Ac-
cordingly, there would be no cause of action against an individual
because of failure to protect property from destruction by fire which
was started by another unless a duty to quench the fire or indemnify
the loss had been assumed by agreement or imposed by statute. There
was no such agreement in this instance, the liability rested solely on
the city charter defining its power of government, which has been
interpreted as not to protect the personal interest of the individual but
for the benefit of the community as a whole. "If the plaintiff is to
prevail, one who negligently omits to supply sufficient pressure to
extinguish a fire started by another assumes an obligation to pay the
ensuing damage, though the whole city is laid low. A promisor will
not be deemed to have had in mind the assumption of a risk so over-
whelming for any trivial reward." 1 An intention to allow the people
of the city to recover for fire damages to their property for any omis-
5 Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, 295, 25 Sup. Ct. 243 (1905).
1 Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 166, 159 N. E. 896, 898
(1928).
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